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Articles
THE IMAGE CANNOT SPEAK FOR ITSELF:
FILM, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND VISUAL
LITERACY
Naomi Mezey*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the Supreme Court held that a Georgia police officer did not
violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the plaintiff, who was fleeing
police, when the officer intentionally caused the plaintiff’s car to crash
and rendered the plaintiff quadriplegic.1 The most striking aspect of
Scott v. Harris is that the existence of video evidence changed the Court’s
approach not only to the facts but to the legal analysis. The question
before the Court was whether summary judgment was proper. The
lower courts had found conflicting material facts, but the Supreme Court
concluded that summary judgment could be granted on the basis of the
video evidence alone.2 The decision relied on the video taken of the
chase from the squad car’s “dash-mounted video camera.”3 The Court
announced that it was pleased “to allow the videotape to speak for
itself.”4 For the first time, the Court cited to a video link in an opinion
and posted the video on the Supreme Court webpage to assure its public
availability.5
Video images saturate our public and private lives. Moving images
are the norm of entertainment and advertising—on city streets, subways,
and personal screens—as they are increasingly the norm within intimate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A much earlier version of this
Article was originally presented as the Seegers Lecture on Jurisprudence at Valparaiso
University Law School in November 2011. I am indebted to the intelligent and diligent
research assistance of Gabe Lezra and Matthew Murrell, the insightful comments of Lisa
Heinzerling, Marty Lederman, Nina Pillard, Mike Seidman, Gerry Spann, and Larry Solum,
as well as fruitful conversation on the topic with colleagues at Valparaiso, University of
Virginia, and Georgetown law schools.
1
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 375, 381 (2007) (concluding that no reasonable juror could
find that the fleeing driver did not pose a deadly risk to the public).
2
Id. at 378–81.
3
Id. at 380–81; see id. at 391 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the “dashmounted video camera” was activated automatically when the police officer turned on his
lights).
4
Id. at 378 n.5 (majority opinion).
5
Id.; see VIDEO RESOURCES, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx.
*
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spaces and private communication as well. Images “surround us in the
same way as a language surrounds us.”6 Images are a language, a form
of visual communication, and they deserve and require the same
attention we give to language. As the realities of our own lives are
increasingly dominated by images, it is not surprising that they have
become ubiquitous within the law, presented in litigation and other lawrelated contexts as photographs, film, illustrations, diagrams,
reenactments, visual aids, displays of physical evidence, computer
animation, x-rays, and fingerprints. Video images specifically are also
increasingly common within what was once the primarily textual and
oral domain of the law. The most pervasive examples are the videos
produced by security cameras as well as the cameras placed on the
inside and outside of police officers’ cars and clipped on officers’ bodies;7
along with the images from personal cell phones, these cameras capture
many conflicts, large and small, that make their way to the courtroom.8
In the legal encounter with the image, there is a recurring assumption
that images assist us in seeing more clearly and, in seeing more clearly,
we get closer to “the truth.”9 But images produced by cameras and
computers are always mediated, their meaning influenced by aspects of
the medium, the context of viewing, and the perceptions of the viewer.
That mediation is still frequently overlooked and was overlooked in Scott
v. Harris. In this Article, I call for greater sensitivity to the distance
between seeing and knowing and to how we make images speak, not to
mention what we have them say.

JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 32 (1972). Even Freud’s classic “mirror stage” has
become animated. See PHILIPPE JULIEN, JACQUES LACAN’S RETURN TO FREUD 48–52 (Devra
Beck Simiu trans., 1994) (discussing the “mirror stage” as initially presented by Lacan and
influenced by Freud). The child with the mirror has become the child taking videos of
herself on a computer.
7
Erica Goode, Video, a New Tool for the Police, Poses New Legal Issues, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/police-usingbody-mounted-video-cameras.html?_r=1&emc=eta1 (discussing the use of body- and dashmounted video cameras to document arrests, traffic stops, and shootings).
8
Id. (recognizing that judges are now faced with issues raised by new technologies,
such as police conduct videos recorded by citizens and later promptly uploaded to
YouTube).
9
I am neither committed to the proposition that there is “a truth” of the matter in any
given legal dispute nor to the conviction that there is not such a truth. For purposes of this
Article, I am agnostic on this point and concerned more with the ways in which video
evidence can guide judicial judgment about what facts need to be known. This
determination usually both assumes an underlying truth and that the video can offer
clarity on it.
6
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Despite a common-sense awareness that images do not always “tell
the truth,” courts still routinely find video evidence to be conclusive.10
Even when they see conflicting images or hear conflicting interpretations
of images, courts offer very little analysis of video evidence, instead
assuming that unaltered images—either as a whole or broken down into
their constituent frames—provide direct and accurate access to the
reality they seem to convey.11 This is the problem that motivates this
Article: courts and legal actors lack a critical vocabulary of the visual,
and without visual literacy, they are more likely to be unduly credulous
in the face of images.
The lack of visual literacy is especially and problematically evident
at summary judgment, when judges can end cases if they find that there
is no genuine factual dispute.12 Without a vocabulary for interpreting
and interrogating visual images, video evidence is more likely to be seen
as conclusive and used to grant summary judgment where it otherwise
would not be. Indeed, this assumption that videos have a reliable factual
conclusiveness has not only been modeled by the Supreme Court but has
been used to alter the standard summary judgment analysis.
In Scott v. Harris, eight Justices used a police video to justify
departing from the traditional summary judgment standard, which
requires that courts refrain from weighing evidence and view the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.13 The Court believed
that the video allowed it to see accurately what occurred during the
chase and noted that there was no indication that “what it depict[ed]
differ[ed] from what actually happened.”14 The Court did not apply the
well-established lens that requires courts to view the evidence “in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” here, the victim of the
police’s use of force; instead, the Supreme Court announced what we
must read as a new summary judgment standard and admonished the
court of appeals for not viewing the facts “in the light depicted by the
videotape.”15
However, the Court fails to acknowledge that “the light depicted by
the videotape” is left to the perception of the viewing judge. Without the
assumption that videotapes, like eyewitnesses, have only one
perspective, and without a critical vocabulary of the sort used to analyze
human fallibility or textual ambiguity, this new standard invites judges
10
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 1–5 (discussing the use of video evidence in
Scott v. Harris).
11
See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
12
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
13
Scott, 550 U.S. at 373, 380–81.
14
Id. at 378.
15
Id. at 380–81.
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to displace the jury even when the facts depicted by the video are
disputed by the parties. Not surprisingly, the Court’s approach to video
evidence at summary judgment appears to have been very influential,
especially in the context of police misconduct and excessive force
claims.16 Moreover, the Court heard Plumhoff v. Rickard in March 2014.17
This excessive force case, factually quite similar to Scott v. Harris and
likewise based on video evidence, seems to ensure that the Supreme
Court will continue to model its impoverished approach to the legal
interpretation of images.
Others have noted the need for a visual jurisprudence and have
started on that endeavor.18 My approach adds to the larger project of
resisting the legal authority of the image and providing some
interpretive tools with which to dismantle the undue credulity of courts
in the face of visual evidence. It takes its inspiration as much from film
as from law because film studies and visual culture have a long tradition
of making sense of images and providing a vocabulary of visual
literacy.19 One of the best examples of a film that conveys why it is
important for the law to have a critical visual vocabulary is the 2002
movie Minority Report,20 with its sophisticated reflection on the legal uses
and abuses of visual evidence.

16
See Martin A. Schwartz et al., Analysis of Videotape Evidence in Police Misconduct Cases,
25 TOURO L. REV. 857, 863 (2009) (“The lower federal courts have latched on to Scott. There
are more and more rulings on summary judgment in favor of police officers based on
videotape evidence.”); Nina Frank, Note, Such Visible Fiction: The Expansion of Scott v.
Harris to Prisoner Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claims, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1481, 1485–
86, 1497–1502 (2011) (discussing several cases with varying fact patterns where district
courts have relied on the standard in Scott to grant or deny summary judgment for
defendant correctional officers). But see, e.g., Moore v. Casselberry, 584 F. Supp. 2d 580,
585–87 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (refusing to grant summary judgment in an excessive force case,
reasoning that “although the credibility of plaintiff’s testimony concerning the alleged
assault [was] certainly inconsistent with [video] evidence and [was] subject to serious
question, it [was] not so blatantly false that the Court may simply reject it as a matter of
law”).
17
Plumhoff v. Rickard, No. 12-1117 (U.S. argued Mar. 4, 2014) (presenting the question
whether it was error to deny qualified immunity in a case nearly identical to Scott v.
Harris).
18
See generally NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT (2009); Richard K. Sherwin, Visual
Jurisprudence, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11 (2012–2013).
19
See, e.g., FILM THEORY AND CRITICISM 1–7 (Leo Braudy & Marshall Cohen eds., 5th ed.
1999) (discussing the ways in which film is a language); RICHARD HOWELLS & JOAQUIM
NEGREIROS, VISUAL CULTURE 1 (2d ed. 2012) (noting the importance of learning to read
visual texts using the same rigor with which we read printed texts).
20
MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 2002); Synopsis for
Minority Report, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0181689/synopsis (last updated
Aug. 2013). Plot descriptions are those of the author.
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Set in Washington D.C. in 2054, Minority Report focuses on a
“precrime” police unit that arrests people just before they commit
murder. The police know who the perpetrators are because of the
visions of the three precognitives (“precogs”)—the three sibling seers
who lie in a state of suspended animation in a pool of photon milk with
headgear that projects their prescient visions onto a big screen to be
viewed by the police. Police sort through the images on a screen by
“scrubbing” them, literally pushing aside and culling out the relevant
details from an overabundance of visual evidence, to determine the
location of the approaching crime so they can apprehend the perpetrator
before it happens. Within the police world of the movie, the images
appear to “speak for themselves” even when they have the inchoate
character of dreams. Despite the fact that the precrime unit recognizes
that some visual details are not relevant, the officers operate under the
assumption that the images are fully reliable and always “tell the truth.”
The plot is driven by the fact that John Anderton, the chief of the
precrime unit, finds his own name inscribed as the perpetrator of an
imminent murder and sets out to prove his innocence before the crime
happens. He finds the woman who discovered the precogs’ abilities, and
she tells him the secret that saves him and kills the program: while the
precogs are never wrong about what they see, sometimes they disagree
when one of them sees things differently from the other two. These
dissenting interpretations are the visual “minority reports,” which are
instantly destroyed because for precrime to function “there can’t be any
suggestion of fallibility. After all, what good is a Justice system that
instills doubt?”21
As this interpretive fallibility comes to light—its revelation projected
onto a screen within the movie—the program collapses, as does a
commitment to the truth of the image. Thus, the secret of the film is also
the secret of law’s faith in the infallibility of the image, and the film’s
solution provides a vital lesson for the law: even the most reliable
images have at least one minority report—another way of seeing—that
ought to be considered before video evidence seduces courts into an
undue credulity that images depict “what actually happened” and can
provide legal actors with the truth of contested events. Like the fictional
precrime unit, the Supreme Court is committed to a fantasy of the truth
of the image that encourages judges’ ways of seeing to displace juries’
ways of seeing.

MINORITY REPORT, supra note 20. The Minority Report script is available at
http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/MINORITY_REPORT_--_May_16th_2001_revised_
draft_by_Scott_Frank.html.

21
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In law, it is utterly ordinary for us to see and argue about the
ambiguity of language and text; whereas, it is extraordinary for us to
see—let alone argue about—the ambiguity of the image. However, in
the last decade or so, there has been a tremendous growth in scholarship
at the intersection of law and the visual.22 While this scholarship is
varied, all of it attests to the fact that the visual has occasioned a
paradigm shift in the way legal meaning is constructed. The law itself,
however, has yet to acknowledge or account for this shift in any serious
way. Even while the law reflects scant attention to the insights of other
fields, popular culture has a much longer tradition of taking law
seriously and not so seriously; legal shows and movies have been a
mainstay of the film and television industries for over half a century.23
Whether the visual appears within the spaces of the law or the law
within the visual media, their mutual engagement is a source of
important inquiry for legal scholars and lawyers. The aim here is to
advocate for the importance of, and sketch one approach to, a visual
literacy that could provide us with ways to critically assess the use of
images within the law generally and at summary judgment in particular.
This Article urges a visual vocabulary that is attentive to the
cinematic and cultural mediations of video evidence; accounts for the
medium, the act of viewing, and the viewer; and reads images as if they
were a minority report or another interpretive perspective. The term
“minority” in this context is meant to convey a double meaning, not only
a dissenting view but also a different way of seeing informed by
different lived experiences, including the history and contexts of
minority perspectives.24 A critical visual literacy can help us visualize
how we might give legal images multiple voices and narrate their
multiple ways of seeing.
I approach this topic by borrowing ideas from art, film, and cultural
theory to help lay a foundation for visual literacy within the law. This
Article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides a brief discussion of
visuality and the ways the image has been thought to apprehend reality
and hence “tell the truth.” Part III reviews how the image has been
taken up by the law and its uneasy role as evidence. Last, Part IV
22
The scholars whose work has influenced me most strongly are Amy Adler, Neal
Feigenson, Rebecca Johnson, Orit Kamir, Jennifer Mnookin, Austin Sarat, Richard Sherwin,
Jessica Silbey, Martha Umphrey, and Alison Young, to name only a few.
23
See Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles, Screening the Law: Ideology and Law in American
Popular Culture, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 114–66 (2005) (describing the history of television
shows and movies about law).
24
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 897–98, 903 (2009) (explaining how
the Court ignores others’ beliefs).
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provides a comparison of three paradigmatic approaches to the use of
documentary images at summary judgment and reassesses them from
the vantage point of visual literacy: Scott v. Harris and the more recent
cases of Gilfand v. Planey and McDowell v. Sherrer. These three cases are
similar in that they are all excessive force cases that turn primarily on
video evidence; together they provide the framework for contrasting
different approaches to visual representation in the law and considering
what a critical visual literacy would add to the law’s use of filmic
evidence.
The Article’s first claim is simple, yet too often ignored by legal
actors and flatly contradicted by the Supreme Court: the image cannot
speak for itself. An undue credulity in the image will lead to more
injustice as judges assume that the camera provides them with an
unmediated perception of events, a perception that is necessarily the
product of their own experience. I do not go so far as to claim video
images never provide reliable information that speaks to a material issue
from which a court could grant summary judgment, but only that much
of the time the depictions of the video are themselves open to
interpretive dispute and ought to be critically examined like text or
testimony. The Article’s second claim is that images produce an excess
of information, an “orgy of evidence,”25 and that by seeming to say so
much, images appear to say more than they do. In the face of images,
courts are more likely to think they can answer a relevant legal question
in a case or to frame the legal question through the available evidence. If
the legal profession remains visually illiterate and fails to appreciate the
many ways images speak, as well as the limitations of what those images
can say, it risks sacrificing the crucial role of the law in interpretation,
judgment, and justice.
II. WAYS OF SEEING AND APPREHENSIONS OF THE REAL
Art critic and novelist John Berger began his influential book Ways of
Seeing with the following observation: “Seeing comes before words. The
child looks and recognizes before it can speak.”26 Seeing does have a
place of privilege within the law, as exemplified by the eyewitness—the
quintessential bearer of evidentiary information.
Yet with the
eyewitness, we know to question the relationship between what is seen
and what is known. We accept that perceptions differ and that people
have ways of seeing, recalling, and narrating that influence what is seen
and known.
25
26

MINORITY REPORT, supra note 20.
BERGER, supra note 6, at 7.
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When the camera is the eyewitness, however, we often lose these
critical instincts. In the face of mechanical reproduction of the world, we
tend to forget two important things: first, even unmanned surveillance
cameras have ways of seeing, framing, and distorting the events they
capture and that they have modes of perception; and second, when
viewers watch the images cameras produce, visual interpretation is
multiplied. As Berger says, “although every image embodies a way of
seeing, our perception or appreciation of an image depends also upon
our own way of seeing.”27 In other words, the sight captured in the
image produces at least one way of seeing—though often more—and
excludes others, and our viewing of the image produces at least another
way of seeing—though often more—and excludes others.
Enlightenment, modernity, and postmodernity have all contributed
to structuring, deconstructing, and multiplying our ways of seeing, not
to mention our understandings of truth, reality, and representation.
According to Berger, the conventions of the European oil painting
defined our understanding of the visual image for 400 years.28 Its way of
seeing was based on the technique of perspective, in which the viewer is
placed at the all-seeing center, and the “visible world is arranged for the
spectator as the universe was once thought to be arranged for God.”29 In
the twentieth century, however, the camera and modernity fractured our
fundamental sense of the visual into a multiplicity that depended on
positionality.30 It made it possible to imagine countless different images
of the same scene.
Every drawing or painting that used perspective
proposed to the spectator that he was the unique centre
of the world. The camera—and more particularly the
movie camera—demonstrated that there was no centre.
The invention of the camera changed the way men
saw. The visible came to mean something different to
them.31
Berger’s is certainly not the only theory of perception and visual
culture, and it is not my aim to canvas the various approaches to visual
theory in this Article. I use both Berger’s terminology and his argument
because it helps clarify my larger point—that images cannot speak for
themselves because both the images and their viewers have multiple
27
28
29
30
31
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ways of seeing. On the one hand, the history of Western art is the
history of how Westerners have been taught to be viewers.
Enlightenment art both mimicked and made a particular reality. We
have learned to perceive the world as if we were at the center of what
there was to see. On the other hand, the camera’s ubiquitous presence
continues to encourage us to believe that we can see everything. Most
viewers of evidentiary images bring with them cultural assumptions that
inform what is visible and how it is visible.
Modern and postmodern artists and visual theorists have continued
to try to teach us new ways of seeing, though these lessons have not been
fully learned in part because they involve unlearning deeply engrained
Enlightenment understandings.
Modernism took the ruptures
occasioned by both the camera and capitalism, among other things, and
used them to question the nature of the image, perception, and
representation. Impressionism, cubism, and surrealism were all engaged
with making evident and reflecting on new ways of seeing and knowing,
as well as new relationships between the image, the viewer, and the
object of the image.
René Magritte’s famous realistic painting of the pipe is now the
classic case in point.32 He wrote on the canvas beneath the picture, “Ceci
n’est pas une pipe,” or “This is not a pipe,” to force the viewer to
consider the difference between an image and its referent and to see the
painting not as a pipe but more precisely as a painting of a pipe.33 As
Magritte said of this painting, appropriately entitled The Treachery of
Images: “How people reproached me for it! And yet, could you stuff my
pipe? No, it’s just a representation, is it not? So if I had written on my
picture ‘This is a pipe,’ I’d have been lying!”34 Magritte’s own statement
pushes the point—would it have been lying to have written below the
picture, “This is a pipe”? What is the truth of this image? And how does
Magritte’s narration of the image change its possible meanings?

32
RENÉ MAGRITTE, THE TREACHERY OF IMAGES (1929), reproduced at http://www.renemagritte.org/the-treachery-of-images.jsp (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
33
Id.; see Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 683, 689 (2012) (discussing the meanings of The Treachery of Images).
34
HARRY TORCZYNER, MAGRITTE: IDEAS AND IMAGES 118 (John P. O’Neill & Ellen
Schwartz eds., Richard Miller trans., 1977). Not surprisingly, Michel Foucault wrote an
essay also entitled This is Not a Pipe about the contradictions between the text and image in
Magritte’s painting. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THIS IS NOT A PIPE (James Harkness ed. & trans.,
2d ed. 2008).
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The Treachery of Images, by René Magritte, 1929
If modernity was concerned with representation and ways of seeing,
postmodernity might be said to be concerned with epistemology and
ways of knowing. If Magritte’s painting has a postmodern successor, it
is the work This is a Pipe, by anonymous English street artist Banksy,35
known for his stenciled graffiti, paintings, social satire, and the film Exit
Through the Giftshop.36 This is a Pipe is a “painting” in which the frame
partly encloses a painted wall with a pipe and spigot coming out of it.
Beneath the pipe is written “This is a pipe,” in the same style Magritte
used in his painting. The reference is clear, but the humor is reversed
and multiplied.
While Magritte insisted that representation was
something different from its referent, such that a painting of a pipe is a
painting rather than a pipe, Banksy suggests that we see both the pipe
and the painting as real and the commercial production of art as the
medium through which each is given meaning. The frame makes the
“real” pipe a painting, but the frame is placed inside the edges of the
wall so that we see its artifice and must acknowledge its power to change
our perception. In addition to asking us to reflect on representation,
Banksy asks us to reflect on presentation, framing, the meaning of art,
and epistemology. Banksy’s pipe can also be seen as a metaphor for how
the camera frames images and how the context in which we view them—

BANKSY,
THIS
IS
A
PIPE,
reproduced
at
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/UyQfKdhx7K8/T04SYnjOeuI/AAAAAAAAEPE/nMv1C_beCJk/s1600/Banksy-this-is-apipe.jpg (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
36
EXIT THROUGH THE GIFT SHOP (Paranoid Pictures 2010).
35
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courtroom, movie theater, office, etc.—changes how we make sense of
what we see.

This is a Pipe, by Banksy
It may well be that like Banksy’s pipe, film and computer-aided
video images are as much the paradigm of postmodern representation as
Magritte’s The Treachery of Images was for modernist representation. Film
technologies have ushered in new disruptions of the real and of
representation and show more vividly in their motion, animation, and
juxtaposition, the discursive power of moving images. Film not only
represents but narrates, and in so doing, brings into being new forms of
seeing and meaning-making that should be distinguished from
enlightenment painting, modern art, and even the photograph.37
We have all become viewers who are used to seeing edited films and
accept film editing as a kind of narration. Film editors choose and
sequence images and scenes, cut out the images that are not necessary to
the story, and do it in a way that is usually unnoticeable to the viewer.
In his brilliant book on film editing, Walter Murch explores the mystery
of the “cut,” the most basic tool of film editing, and why it works “even
37
Richard Sherwin argues that different screen technologies should also be
distinguished from each other. Richard K. Sherwin, What Screen Do You Have in Mind?
Contesting the Visual Context of Law and Film Studies, in 46 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
SOCIETY 3, 5 (Austin Sarat ed., 2009).
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though it represents a total and instantaneous displacement of one field
of vision with another, a displacement that sometimes also entails a jump
forward or backward in time as well as space.”38 One explanation for
why the cut’s disruption of reality works in film is because at its most
violent it mimics how we jump between and juxtapose images in
dreams. At its most subtle it operates like the blink of an eye—an
interruption of visual continuity that we do not even notice.39 The result
is that film editing works, and it works on us, making us into viewers
who both see and do not see the way images narrate, even when the
framing and cutting are not the products of deliberate choices.
Notably, these various disruptions of the real—as I have called
them—are not a clichéd postmodern claim that there is no reality and no
truth. Both modernity and postmodernity have insisted, at the very
least, on multiple realities and multiple truths, which ought to prompt us
to look for minority reports. As John Fiske explains:
The . . . realities of postmodernity are both pluralized
and extend along two axes—one of the discourse into
which reality is put and by which it is known to be real,
and the other of the social conditions of those who
experience that reality as their own, and who experience
it as real, although it may differ from the reality
experienced by those positioned differently.40
Fiske, like Berger, wants to make evident that images do not come with
ready-made meaning but are understood through the “discourses” into
which they are put, or what I have been calling their multiple
mediations.
We can and should be more attentive to the ways in which images
are made meaningful by reflecting on the different techniques of visual
interpretation evident in the medium, viewing context, and individual
viewer. For example, film as a medium is understood through its two
key “grammatical components: the shot and the edit. The shot is
completed inside the camera and is the most fundamental grammatical
unit of the cinema. The edit is the order and way the shots are put
together.”41

WALTER MURCH, IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE: A PERSPECTIVE ON FILM EDITING 5 (2d ed.
2001).
39
Id. at 58–60.
40
John Fiske, Admissible Postmodernity: Some Remarks on Rodney King, O.J. Simpson, and
Contemporary Culture, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 917, 917–18 (1996).
41
HOWELLS & NEGREIROS, supra note 19, at 212.
38
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Thus, we cannot fully assess the significance of video evidence
without thinking about the medium’s own way of seeing. We might
consider the shot by asking about the position of the camera, the angle,
and the way the images are framed. Likewise, the selection of the
images by either machine or human is a kind of edit undertaken in law
usually by the parties, the lawyers, or the judge. In addition to the film
medium, meaning is influenced by the environment in which the image
is experienced: the museum, the Hollywood premiere, the classroom, or
the courtroom.42 Finally, images are experienced and understood with
reference to the lived “social conditions” that inform the perceptions of
the viewer, the audience, or the jurors. Each of these techniques of visual
interpretation that emphasize the medium, the viewing context, and the
audience, creates an opportunity for alternative perspectives, and each
contributes to the possible narratives through which we make sense of
the images. Both law and film are powerful discourses that frame and
narrate images in particular ways and, hence, partly shape our
understandings and expectations of what we can see in a given context.
Likewise, the camera and computer have helped to create their own
ways of seeing and, in a sense, their own viewers, as we, their spectators,
have arranged our understandings of the visual accordingly.
Within the discourse of law, however, without a critical visual
vocabulary, we often insist on not seeing what art and technologies have
taught us. We forget that cameras frame the images they capture and
render unseen those things outside the frame; that they always situate
the viewer relative to the image; that film and video narrate as well as
depict; and that images have different meanings in different contexts to
people with different ways of seeing. We see images differently when
we see them in a classroom, in a bedroom, or on a city street. For
example, the images I discuss in this Article will have a different
meaning than they would if they were not illustrating my words in a law
review article and if they were not being used in the service of my own
argument.43 In other words, the images speak powerfully, but they
cannot, despite Justice Scalia’s insistence to the contrary, speak for
themselves.

LOUIS-GEORGES SCHWARTZ, MECHANICAL WITNESS: A HISTORY OF MOTION PICTURE
EVIDENCE IN U.S. COURTS 10 (2009) (“The moving image . . . always appears within a
particular institution and is conditioned by that institution’s pragmatic requirements and
history.”).
43
Berger makes this argument with respect to his own essay. “In this essay each image
reproduced has become part of an argument which has little or nothing to do with the
painting’s original independent meaning. The words have quoted the paintings to confirm
their own verbal authority.” BERGER, supra note 6, at 28.
42
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III. THE PROMISE AND THREAT OF THE LEGAL IMAGE
Art history, cultural theory, and film itself have long understood that
in the face of images the viewer feels like a witness to a scene which has
simply been revealed rather than deliberately choreographed; the law,
however, lacks such a history of critical engagement with the visual.
Instead, law has simply fluctuated between two convictions: visual
evidence is either self-evidently probative or deeply prejudicial. What
law lacks is the courage of its own critical history. Legal theories—
particularly Legal Realism, critical legal studies, and critical race
studies—have provided a tradition of questioning the coherence of
standard legal categories and of exposing the interpretations,
assumptions, and positionality on which analogic reasoning and legal
judgment depend. Law and humanities scholarship now provides a rich
vocabulary and a set of methodologies for reading images within law. A
visual literacy within law must draw on these critical traditions that
already exist within legal scholarship and deploy the complimentary
insights of other fields. The question remains whether legal practice can
take the developing visual jurisprudence to heart.
The following section borrows generally from law and humanities
scholarship and specifically from the work of Jennifer Mnookin and
Jessica Silbey to briefly recount the history and practice of visual
evidence. Thereafter, this Article considers the most famous example of
visual evidence—the Rodney King video—from the perspective of
critical race theory, to begin to explore one possibility of what minority
reporting might mean when applied to legal images.
A. Legal Evidence
Within the domain of law, the image has operated as both a promise
and a threat. Its promise is as proof, in which the photograph or film
provides direct access to the thing or event it depicts. From its inception,
the photograph’s allure was that it promised to be more witness than
hearsay, and as a witness, more reliable than an eyewitness who was
human and hence fallible.44 It seemed to represent the truth through the
mechanical ingenuity of the camera, untouched by human subjectivity
and intervention. Indeed, the photograph could be thought of as
replicating rather than representing what it captures. As Roland Barthes
said of the photograph, its “essence is to ratify what it represents.”45
Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy,
10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 18–19 (1998).
45
ROLAND BARTHES, CAMERA LUCIDA: REFLECTIONS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 85 (Richard
Howard trans., 1981).
44
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Indeed, the seduction of the photograph is that it appears not to
“represent” at all, but instead narrows the distance between image and
object.46 It appears to allow us to see the object with our own eyes.
The power of photographic and video evidence, much like that of
rhetoric, is also what makes it a threat to law. As Jennifer Mnookin
noted in her astute history of photographic evidence, “mechanically
generated images were simultaneously viewed as offering privileged
access to truth and as potentially misleading and manipulable.”47
Mnookin argues that photographic images are threatening in at least
three ways. First, if they are treated as proof objects that portray an
incontestable truth, they could potentially displace the trial altogether.48
Second, to the extent images are manipulable, they could evade the truth
through appeal to sensation and prejudice; their very vividness
threatening to produce an emotional rather than a rational response.49
Lastly, photographs are also seen as products of human action and
judgment, subject to distortion and manipulation.50 As judges attempted
to domesticate both the power and threat of photographic images by
developing the category of “demonstrative evidence,” a change in what
counted as effective proof was also taking place.51 The photographic
image had effectuated a shift in legal ways of seeing so that “proving
something now often required letting a jury see for itself, appealing to
jurors not only through argument, but directly through the senses. . . . At
least to a certain extent, seeing had become believing.”52
Contained in the legal category of demonstrative evidence was the
paradox of the photographic image as both “mere illustration”—like any
other diagram, map, or visual aid that complements verbal testimony—
and as compelling access to an underlying “truth.”53 Thus, it is not
surprising that visual images also came to be admitted, not merely as
guides to organizing or understanding testimony or documentary
evidence, but as substantive evidence available as proof supporting
disputed facts. Now that images have moved from the periphery to

See JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POST CARD: FROM SOCRATES TO FREUD AND BEYOND 35
(1987).
47
Mnookin, supra note 44, at 7.
48
Id. at 20.
49
Id. at 20–21, 65–66.
50
Id. at 20–21.
51
Id. at 5–6.
52
Id. at 66.
53
Id. at 69–70.
46
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become a central form of legal evidence, lawyers, judges and the media
must become more adept at assessing their legibility.54
As legal evidence, images are not always a good fit with the process
by which law turns contested facts into knowledge and judgment.55
Jessica Silbey has argued that because filmic evidence gives the powerful
illusion of reality and suggests that viewers can simply draw their own
conclusions, as if they were witnesses, film evidence ought to be crossexamined with the same critical scrutiny as are other witnesses.56
Especially true when images seem most self-evident and legible, courts
may be inclined to think those images tell us more than they do about
the legal questions before them. As a result, courts may make errors
about where to fit visual evidence into their assessment of the case. One
of Silbey’s significant scholarly contributions has been to introduce more
of the grammar and history of film—from montage, angle, and editing
on the one hand, to the critical history of cinema studies on the other—to
encourage lawyers and judges to interrogate filmic evidence.57 Yet when
images become objects of forensic scrutiny and evidential examination,
their examination still tends to be minimal—urging the viewer to trust,
or not trust, what she sees. The problem, as I see it, goes far beyond the
courtroom; it is pervasive in law offices, classrooms, and the media.
Visual literacy must begin earlier and be reinforced in law school if we
want lawyers and judges to be capable critics of the image.
In the face of images, a visual literacy must ask the important
questions suggested by all the scholars I have mentioned: In what ways
do images themselves see, speak, and narrate (film theory)? What do
images portray? What do the portrayals mean? In what way are they
relevant to the legal questions before the court (legal and linguistic
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Semi-Legibility and Visual Evidence: An Initial Exploration, 2012 L.
CULTURE & HUMAN. 1, 6 (“This notion of semi-legibility usefully focuses our attention on
the ways that much visual evidence neither speaks for itself nor permits unbounded
interpretations, but rather, has a range of plausible—and potentially inconsistent—
readings.”).
55
Jessica Silbey, Images in/of Law, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 171, 172 (2012–2013).
56
Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 17,
19 (2008).
57
See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257,
1280–81 (2010) [hereinafter Silbey, Evidence Verité] (“The law requires this kind of critical
evaluation when assessing evidence. But what does it mean to critically evaluate a
photograph?”); Silbey, supra note 55, at 181 (describing how film theory can be integrated
into the existing legal framework); Jessica Silbey, Judges as Film Critics: New Approaches to
Filmic Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 506, 540–41, 561–62, 570 (2004) [hereinafter
Silbey, Judges as Film Critics] (discussing problems with accepting film evidence as
substantive proof of a material fact); Jessica Silbey, Persuasive Visions: Film and Memory,
2012 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 1, 4, 6–9 (2012) [hereinafter Silbey, Persuasive Visions]
(discussing the self-critiquing nature of film).
54
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interpretation)? And how do different audiences see, read, and make
sense of images (critical race and reception theories)? In addition, we
should ask how images are given meaning by placing them in different
contexts or weaving them into larger social and political discourses.
Lastly, we should reverse these questions to ask what the image does not
show and how the image might fail to answer the material legal
questions in any given case.
The image is excessive in its realities, its fictions, and in the medium
itself. It shows us more than we can absorb and less than we hope. Its
excess helps explain both the probative and prejudicial qualities of the
image. As the image comes to serve as evidence, it provides so much
information that we must be especially careful to recognize what
information it does not provide. Its excesses tend to mask its limitations.
The image presents an “orgy of evidence.” This phrase comes from a
scene in Minority Report, when the main character—and the audience—
comes across a bed strewn with photographs.58 They are almost
immediately comprehensible to the viewer, but we later learn that we
have not comprehended them properly. Indeed, we are told we should
have been suspicious of this “orgy of evidence” precisely because it
appeared to tell us exactly what we wanted to know. It is no accident
that the orgy of evidence in the film is comprised of images. Particularly
when seen in an environment like the courtroom—comprised of texts
and documents—images appear to provide more powerful and direct
access to facts and events.59 Because the image gives us so much
information, it tends to seduce us into thinking that it is also the
information we need. It can be easy to forget that there are crucial
questions it may fail to answer. Each time the image is used as evidence,
we must be sure to ask, “evidence of what?”

Synopsis for Minority Report, supra note 20.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 78–79 (“Video appeared as a window onto events rather
than as one evidentiary medium among others.”).
58
59
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An Orgy of Evidence: Minority Report (Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation 2002)
B. Rodney King and Minority Reporting
What might it mean to take minority reports seriously, especially if
“minority” also carries its racial meaning and we apply the insights of
critical race theory? The video of Rodney King’s beating by Los Angeles
police officers is a ready-made example as well as a crucial moment in
the history of video evidence more broadly. This video is one of the
earliest, and certainly the most famous, instances of the now common
linkage between law, video, and racial violence. In 1991, after a highspeed chase, Rodney King was beaten by Los Angeles Police Department
Officers, and most of the incident was captured on videotape by George
Holliday, a local resident who filmed the scene from his balcony.60 It
was the video—broadcasted nationally on network television before
Internet use was common—showing police beating a black man, helpless
on the ground, that ignited widespread anger about police brutality
against African Americans. The broadcast of that video turned the
subsequent criminal trial into a national event and the acquittal of the
officers into a regional riot.61 Most television viewers—whether white or
black—felt that the video spoke for itself and that it showed racially
The Learning Network, May 1, 1992: Rodney King Asks, ‘Can We All Get Along?,’ N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2012, 4:08 AM), http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/may-11992-victim-rodney-kings-asks-can-we-all-get-along/?_r=0.
61
Id.
60
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charged excessive force on the part of the police.62 This faith in images
was shared by prosecutors, who made the video their central piece of
evidence at trial.63 “The force of the Holiday [sic] tape’s testimonial
appearance on television, outside the courtroom, led the prosecution to
assume that the tape would speak for itself in court.”64

Still from Rodney King Video
The defense’s ability to interrogate and re-interpret the video images
is widely credited with its victory.65 In response to the public and
prosecutorial faith in the video’s ability to speak for itself, defense
attorneys broke up and transformed the video into slow-motion
movements, stills, and fractions of body parts to present a visual
counter-narrative of the event.66 That counter-narrative relied on
SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 107 (noting that a Los Angeles Times poll taken a week
after the event showed that ninety-two percent of city residents believed the police used
excessive force); Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENV. U.L.
REV. 283, 291 (1993).
63
Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30,
1992), http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/02/08/home/rodney-verdict.html.
64
SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at 118.
65
See, e.g., Mydans, supra note 63 (attributing the officers’ acquittal to the defense’s use
of the videotape showing King being beaten).
66
Walter Goodman, Critic’s Notebook; Defendants Contend with Video, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/11/news/critic-s-notebook-defendantscontend-with-video.html. Defendants also testified to events which happened outside the
62
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unearthing crucial visual details that were not visible in the real-time
video, suggesting that the experience of watching the video as a whole
was actually misleading.
This most basic technique of visual
interrogation, breaking down the image into a selection of isolated
details, certainly seems to “contradict the judicial faith in images.”67 The
technique disrupts the standard claim of the film image as a perfect
representation that allows the viewer to effectively see the event with her
own eyes and deprives the image of much of its emotional force.
Breaking down the image into its constituent frames in order to reframe
it does not, however, displace the image as a truth object. This standard
technique of the sports replay merely suggests that sometimes the truth
requires technological evidence. At most, it simply allows a different
narrative about “the truth” of what the video shows.68 The jury
acquitted the officers involved in the Rodney King beating because the
defense employed a more sophisticated visual literacy. It did not make
them right, but it made them better lawyers.
How might prosecutors have used visual literacy to present the
video or respond to the counter-narrative? One approach would have
been to mimic the defense technique by unearthing details that
supported their case or showing why the technique itself was
misleading. Another possibility would have been to speak for the video
by explaining why people were right to see it as excessive force by police.
In this instance, being willing to name race and narrate minority
experience is a form of visual interpretation; it highlights the role of
context, audience, and perception, and gives meaning to the image by
placing it in a larger discourse. In the context of many excessive force
and civil rights cases against police, part of the minority report is often
the unspoken but implicit discourse of race and power. As Kimberle
Crenshaw and Gary Peller have argued with respect to the Rodney King
video: “Both the perception of the tape as showing a “reasonable
exercise of force” and the perception of the tape as showing “racist
brutality” depend, not simply on the physiology of visual perception,
but rather on interpretation, on the mediation of perception with
background narratives that give visual images meaning.”69 Crenshaw
and Peller argue that crucial to understanding the perception of the
video is the background reality and lived experience of racism in which
frame before the video began to help mute the power of the video. SCHWARTZ, supra note
42, at 118–19.
67
Piyel Haldar, Law and the Evidential Image, 4 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 139, 140 (2008).
68
But see id. at 151–54 (arguing that details of evidential images are like psychoanalytic
symptoms or textual gaps that once unmoored as detail no longer function as “an object of
representation and . . . resist[] the mimetic basis upon which testimony and proof rest”).
69
Crenshaw & Peller, supra note 62, at 292.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/1

Mezey: The Image Cannot Speak for Itself: Film, Summary Judgment, and V

2013]

The Image Cannot Speak for Itself

21

countless ordinary victims of police brutality never bring claims because
there is no video to give them even a fighting chance of success.70
Another critical race approach to visual interpretation is offered by
Judith Butler who, in her reading of the Rodney King video and trial,
argues that visibility itself is already racially saturated.71 For Butler, the
only way to explain how a video of a man surrounded and brutally
beaten by police can come to be seen as a video of a man who is himself
the source of danger and control is by taking account of how white
people’s perception of black bodies is already pre-loaded with racial
meaning.
This is not a simple seeing, an act of direct perception,
but the racial production of the visible, the workings of
racial constraints on what it means to “see.” Indeed, the
trial calls to be read not only as instruction in racist
modes of seeing but as a repeated and ritualistic
production of blackness . . . .72
A visual jurisprudence informed by racially informed minority reports
would explore, as Butler and critical race theorists do, the many ways in
which visuality, like law itself, “is not neutral to the question of race” but
participates in the creation of racial knowledge and judgment.73
IV. THREE ENCOUNTERS WITH THE IMAGE
I turn now to three judicial encounters between law and the image.
The examples are all different uses of filmic evidence at summary
judgment where what is at stake is the right to trial. I begin with Scott v.
Harris before discussing the more recent cases of Gilfand v. Planey and
McDowell v. Sherrer. Each case takes a slightly different approach to how
they link up video images with key legal questions, though all share
missed opportunities for employing techniques of visual interpretion.
The video evidence I am looking at is all documentary, or what Jessica
Silbey would call “evidence verité.”74 There is no argument that the
images have been consciously altered or manipulated in any way. It is
precisely because this type of evidence is potentially deeply probative,

Id. at 293.
Judith Butler, Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia, in
READING RODNEY KING: READING URBAN UPRISING 15, 16 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed.,
1993).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 17.
74
Silbey, Evidence Verité, supra note 57, at 1257.
70
71
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and seems to invite the viewer to suspend critical judgment in the face of
the authority of the image, that it inspires the least interrogation and
presents the hardest kind of case. I use these cases to explore the ways of
seeing they produce and to reconsider how documentary visual evidence
might be more fully interrogated and narrated using a critical visual
literacy.
A. Scott v. Harris
Others have written well about Scott v. Harris,75 but the case is
instructive for the argument I want to make, and at the moment it is the
most powerful legal precedent on the use and import of visual evidence.
As noted earlier, the question in Scott was whether Officer Scott used
excessive force by pushing Victor Harris’s car off the road in order to end
a high-speed chase, causing his car to flip and leaving him a quadriplegic
at age nineteen.76 Harris was clocked speeding on a road in suburban
Georgia by Officer Reynolds.77 When Harris failed to pull over and
attempted to flee, Reynolds gave chase.78 Part way through the chase,
Officer Scott joined in and asked to take the lead.79 Officer Scott was not
aware of the underlying offense when he asked and was given
permission to force Harris off the road.80 Part of the evidence introduced
were the two videos taken by the cameras mounted on Reynolds’ and
Scott’s police cars; these cameras began recording automatically when
the siren and lights went on.81
The officers moved for summary judgment on Harris’s claim of
excessive use of force, and in considering the motion, the federal district
court had to determine whether there was a genuine factual dispute
about whether Officer Scott’s actions were objectively reasonable under
the circumstances.82 As noted earlier, the federal rules allow a judge to
grant summary judgment in a case where there is insufficient factual

See, e.g., FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 18, at 36–49 (discussing the role played by
two digital videos in Scott v. Harris); Silbey, supra note 56, at 18–19, 24–25 (discussing the
treatment of video footage in Scott v. Harris as substantive evidence).
76
Supra note 1 and accompanying text.
77
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007). According to the record, the county deputy
clocked Harris as traveling seventy-three miles per hour in a fifty-five-mile-per-hour speed
limit. Id.
78
Id. at 374–75.
79
Id. at 375.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 391 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82
Harris v. Coweta Cnty., Ga., No. CIVA 3:01CV148 WBH, 2003 WL 25419527, at *1, *4
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub
nom. Scott, 550 U.S. 372.
75
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disagreement on an essential element and the fact-finding function of the
jury is unnecessary.83 Because the burden for demonstrating the absence
of a genuine issue is on the party moving for summary judgment,84
courts view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment.85 Courts often frame the inquiry by importing the
same question that is asked later on a motion for judgment as a matter of
law: whether a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.86
Applying this standard, the district court concluded that there was
sufficient disagreement in the record about whether the chase posed a
serious threat to public safety that a reasonable jury could find for
Harris; in other words, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury
could find that Officer Scott’s actions were not objectively reasonable but
rather an excessive use of force, thus rendering summary judgment
inappropriate.87 The court noted that it was influenced by the fact that
“prior to Reynolds’ decision to instigate a high-speed chase, Harris’s
only crime was driving 73 miles per hour in a 55 miles-per-hour zone.”88
It then considered additional aspects of the record:
Defendants argue that the crash in the parking lot
between Harris’s car and Scott’s cruiser demonstrated
that Harris presented a significant danger to others.
Viewing the facts in Harris’s favor, however, it appears
that either Scott hit Harris, or that the crash was an
accident. According to the official report submitted by
Sgt. Mark Brown of the Peachtree City Police
Department as well as the testimony of Harris, Scott
rammed Harris’s car. These facts rebut Defendants’
assertion that Harris aggressively used his vehicle to
strike Scott’s cruiser. Additionally, the decision to ram
the vehicle came minutes later, when Harris was driving
away from officers, and when there were no other
motorists or pedestrians nearby, thus casting doubt on
Defendants’ assertion that at the time of the ramming,
Harris posed an immediate threat of harm to others.
Finally, the Court has also considered the fact that the
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see supra text accompanying notes 12–15 (considering how the
Supreme Court of the United States altered the summary judgment standard in Scott v.
Harris).
84
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
85
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
86
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
87
Harris, 2003 WL 25419527 at *5.
88
Id.
83
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officers had the license plate number for Harris’s
vehicle, and the vehicle had not been reported stolen.
Reasonable officers, therefore, would have known that
they could have followed up on the license plate
information at a later time.89
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of summary
judgment.90
Writing for eight Justices of the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia subtly,
but significantly, used the videotape to revise the summary judgment
standard, shifting it away from a fact-intensive inquiry based on the
entire record and conducted primarily at the district court level, at least
when there is persuasive visual evidence. The Court noted that, while
motions for summary judgment usually require the court to view the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and that in
qualified immunity cases this means adopting the plaintiff’s version of
the facts, an undoctored videotape changes the summary judgment
equation: “There is, however, an added wrinkle in this case: existence in
the record of a videotape capturing the events in question. There are no
allegations or indications that this videotape was doctored or altered in
any way, nor any contention that what it depicts differs from what
actually happened.”91
For the Scott majority, the videotape showed an unmediated reality
of “what actually happened,”92 one they felt allowed them to view the
events with their own eyes.93
This conviction, that undoctored
documentary videotapes are not subject to alternative interpretations
and can therefore resolve all disputes over material facts, appears to alter
the traditional summary judgment analysis. “Respondent’s version of
events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury
could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied
on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by
the videotape.”94 Viewing the facts in the light depicted by a police video
Id.
Harris v. Coweta Cnty, Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 821–22 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and
superseded on reh’g, 406 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372
(2007).
91
Scott, 550 U.S. at 378.
92
Id.
93
Justice Breyer in oral argument asserted that “[i]f the [lower] court says that isn’t what
happened, and I see with my eyes that is what happened, what am I supposed to do?”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05-1631), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-1631.pdf.
94
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81 (emphasis added). The phrase “visible fiction” is richly ironic
in this context. Justice Scalia must mean the apparent fiction of assuming Harris’s version
89
90
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is indeed a new wrinkle in summary judgment; it displaces the
presumption in favor of the non-moving party and implicitly asks the
court to weigh the rest of the record against “the truth” of the videotape.
Moreover, this revision of summary judgment has been widely adopted
by courts of appeals.95
The Court’s approach in Scott not only disrupts the summary
judgment standard but likewise ignores the venerable tradition of a
judicial commitment to the rule of law through giving reasons.96 At a
minimum, giving reasons means explaining why one argument is more
persuasive than another or making the case for why one way of seeing
makes more sense than another. One cannot simply say, “your way of
seeing makes no sense; mine is better.” Despite Justice Stevens’ dissent
and the two lower court judgments, the Scott majority does not even
concede there are other ways of viewing the video.97 Justice Scalia
disparaged the court of appeals’ assertion that Harris did not pose a
serious threat to others: “[R]eading the lower court’s opinion, one gets
the impression that respondent, rather than fleeing from police, was
attempting to pass his driving test.”98 The one affirmative claim for the
majority’s reading of the video relies on a visual referent of the most
fictional sort—the Hollywood movie: “what we see on the video more
closely resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening

of the facts in the face of visible evidence to the contrary; but, he misses the ironic
possibility that the visible evidence might also induce fictions of its own.
95
See, e.g., Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that the
forensic evidence offered did not so utterly discredit the testimony that a reasonable jury
could not believe the version of events); Austin v. Redford Twp. Police Dep’t, 690 F.3d 490,
493 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that Scott allows the court of appeals to overlook the evidence
accepted by the district court to the extent that in the “‘light depicted by the videotape’” the
evidence is “‘blatantly contradicted’” (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380–81)); Carnaby v. City of
Hous., 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the plaintiff’s version of facts need
not be relied upon, and the standard of review must simply be “‘the facts in the light
depicted by the videotape’” (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381)); Wallingford v. Olson, 592 F.3d
888, 892 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the videotape evidence contradicted plaintiff’s version
of events and thus the court must view the evidence “‘in the light depicted by the
videotape’” (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381)).
96
This commitment to giving reasons is evident in many contexts, such as the Legal
Process version embodied in “reasoned elaboration.” See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 161, 165–68 (Cambridge Tentative ed. 1958); see also G. Edward White, The Evolution
of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973)
(providing a history of “[r]easoned [e]laboration”).
97
I have conducted an exercise based on Scott v. Harris with hundreds of civil procedure
students, and there is always dramatic disagreement on whether the video allows for
summary judgment.
98
Scott, 550 U.S. at 378–79.
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sort, placing police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of
serious injury.”99
By not differentiating between the chase, different narratives of the
chase, and a visual representation of the chase, the Justices enhanced
their own powers of sight and judgment. They were not only convinced
that the video had a ready-made meaning entirely apart from their own
perceptions—that it spoke for itself—but that this indisputable meaning
so thoroughly contradicted all competing facts in the record that they
could decide the summary judgment question themselves without
remand to the district court.100 The record before the Court did not
consist of the video alone, but for the majority, the persuasive power of
the video trumped everything else in the record. This suggested that
such video evidence can function as a meta-fact through which all other
facts should be viewed and evaluated rather than as yet another piece of
evidence subject to competing interpretations.
Based on this
understanding, the Court held that the “reality” of the video showed that
the car chase posed so substantial a risk of injury to others that no
reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.101
The common law, in particular, has a long tradition of minority
reports—they are the dissenting opinions in which alternative
interpretations are incorporated into the law. Justice Stevens, writing in
dissent, offered alternative arguments that he believed could have
formed the basis of a reasonable jury decision. From Justice Stevens’
perspective, the video provided evidence that supported Harris’s version
of the facts and that, in conjunction with other parts of the record, made
it much less clear whether there was a serious risk of injury to the police
or the public.102 He noted facts not mentioned by the majority—like the
fact that police had already blocked off many intersections, Harris never
drove in the opposite lane, when Harris could not pass a car in front of
him safely, he slowed down, and when he did pass he used his turn
signal.103 Stevens further chides his “colleagues on the jury” for
speculating about the facts and substituting the summary judgment
posture with its own reading of the video.104 Justice Stevens’ dissent
demonstrates a more sophisticated visual literacy by recognizing that the
video images are potentially ambiguous, require interpretation, and
belong to a larger factual record. It also demonstrates a firmer

99
100
101
102
103
104
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Id. at 380.
Id. at 380–81.
Id. at 378, 380.
Id. at 390–94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 391–92.
Id. at 392, 394.
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commitment to the traditional posture of summary judgment. Yet even
Justice Stevens was tempted into believing that the video told a material
truth, even if it was a different truth than the one the majority insisted
on, when he insisted that the video “actually confirms, rather than
contradicts, the lower courts’ appraisal of the factual questions at
issue.”105 That is a version of the seduction of excessive visual data—that
it seems to confirm far more than it possibly can.
One way in which the Scott majority displayed a pronounced visual
illiteracy was in assuming that the video showed them precisely what
they were looking for. At issue in Scott was whether the chase posed
such a threat to public safety that Officer Scott’s actions were objectively
reasonable and therefore did not constitute excessive force as a matter of
law.106 While the video shows us many things and is potentially
probative on many issues involving the chase, one thing that it does not
clearly show is how dangerous the chase was and, therefore, whether
Officer Scott’s actions were reasonable to protect other drivers. We can
fill in missing details from what we might know about car chases,
although that knowledge is itself mostly the product of visual fictions
such as movies and television shows. We can also surmise from other
facts available in the record, which Justice Stevens does in his dissent,107
but the images do not tell us much about the danger the chase posed for
others. It is very hard to tell from the video whether the other traffic is
stopped or moving or how close Harris and the police are to the other
cars. We do not know if the area was likely to have pedestrians or which
intersections were already blocked off. More generally, we do not know
under what conditions police should give chase in the first instance. For
all the video shows, it does not provide much evidence about “the
circumstances” from which courts are to determine reasonableness. In
the face of the orgy of evidence that the video provides, all the Justices
fail to appreciate what the video is unable to say.
So what might a critical and visually literate reading of the videotape
in Scott look like? For starters, the video could be considered in light of
the techniques of visual interpretation I have discussed, asking how the
medium, the viewing context, and the audience might inform or distort
our perception. For example, the dash-cam video places the viewer in
the position of the police. Given the placement of the shot, these videos
do not quite put the viewer in the driver’s seat but on the hood of the

Id. at 390.
See supra text accompanying notes 87–94 (discussing the issue and standard
articulated in Scott).
107
Supra text accompanying note 102.
105
106

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 1

28

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

squad car,108 implicitly asking the audience to see the images from the
perspective of law enforcement. Even if we recognize this influence, it is
hard to escape it for it is part of how these images create their own ways
of seeing, and we have no alternative perspectives. One need only
imagine how different a video taken from the back of Harris’s car, from
the side of the road, or from a helicopter might look to appreciate how
differently each would capture the scene. To the extent Scott reframes
excessive force cases in light of the video, it titlts the view of the events in
favor of the police.
Similarly, the dash-cam technology determines and limits the frame
in part because we do not have the field of vision or a sense of the
periphery we would have if we were in the squad car. The lack of color,
the distorted lights, and the sounds of the police radio all influence our
perception. And with respect to the frame, one should always ask:
What can’t be seen? What is happening off-camera? Is it important?
In this case, what is going on at the edge and outside the frame
seems very important. At a minimum we might want to know how
much traffic there was, if it was stopped, and what the road conditions
were, in order to assess the dangers the chase posed. Presented with
evidentiary images, one should also ask: How were the images selected?
Why do they begin and end where they do? Here, there were two
pursuing police cars and two separate videos. Were both considered in
their entirety? For example, the collision between Harris and Scott in the
shopping center looks very different in the two videos. The one taken
from Scott’s car makes it look as though Scott turned his cruiser into
Harris’s car in order to stop him. Likewise, the viewing environment—
in a courthouse in Georgia or Washington, D.C., in a classroom, or on
YouTube—and who the viewers are, especially their experience with and
assumptions about police, changes the way the video is seen.
In their excellent discussion of the Scott case, Feigenson and Spiesel
accuse the majority of naïve realism—the belief that the images spoke the
truth about the chase and that the words Justice Scalia used to translate
the images into a judicial opinion could forestall further dispute about
their meaning.109 They note that, while posting the videos on the
Supreme Court website was evidence of the Court’s naïve conviction
that everyone would come to the same conclusion, those images have
had the opposite effect.110 “Because we can watch the same material
ourselves, however, the Court’s opinion fails to constrain our view. Its
See FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 18, at 40 (suggesting that the point of view of the
camera is not exactly the driver of the car but the player of a video game).
109
Id. at 48.
110
Id. at 46.
108
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decision becomes less convincing, more subject to question, because of
discrepancies between what we can see and what we are told to see. The
pictures continue to speak.”111 While I agree that the popularization of
legal images allows those images to see and speak in multiple and
continually evolving ways, I want to reiterate that the images cannot do
so by themselves. Images themselves cannot determine their reception
by their myriad viewers whose perceptions are always informed by their
individual experiences and interpretive positions.112
B. Gilfand v. Planey
The fact that a video is part of the record on a motion for summary
judgment does not mean it will always be read by the court to support
summary judgment, even in the context of excessive use of force cases in
which there is often a motion for summary judgment brought by the
defending officers. Widespread visual illiteracy within the law suggests
that courts will read visual evidence poorly, over-estimating what it does
say and under-estimating what it does not say, but it does not tell us
which way these misreadings cut in a case. In Gilfand v. Planey,113 a
federal district court judge in Chicago, Illinois relied primarily on
multiple videos recorded by a bar’s security cameras to deny summary
judgment.114 In this instance, a lack of visual literacy did not jeopardize
the plaintiffs’ right to a jury, but it perpetuated the notion that images
speak for themselves and, in doing so, contributed to an erosion of a
fulsome summary judgment assessment in which the record is
considered as a whole.
The Gilfand dispute arose at a Chicago bar called the Jefferson Tap
around 3:30 a.m. as the bar was closing.115 Brothers Barry and Aaron
Gilfand were playing pool with two friends while a handful of off-duty
police officers were nearby at the bar.116 There is no evidence on how the
conflict began beyond the conflicting testimony of the parties about
exchanged insults, and, as the court notes, the issue is not dispositive of

111
Id. at 48. Feigenson and Spiesel also make the important point that the Supreme Court
altered the videotapes without mentioning this fact on the website. See id. at 46 (pointing
out the differences between the online video and the one submitted in evidence and
implying that these differences were not mentioned on the website).
112
See Dan M. Kahan et al., supra note 24, at 897, 903 (stating that what a video shows
depends on its viewer and that the viewer’s cultural and other ideological commitments
help him see the video in a particular way).
113
No. 07 C 2566, 2011 WL 4036110 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2011).
114
Id. at *1.
115
Id.
116
Id.
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an excessive use of force claim.117 What is relatively clear is that the offduty officers forcibly ended the pool game and violently confronted the
plaintiffs.118 By the end of the fight, Aaron Gilfand had a broken nose,
and both Barry Gilfand and plaintiff Scott Lowrance may have suffered
physical injuries from being attacked by defendants.119 Based on the
events in the bar, plaintiffs brought an excessive use of force claim
against the officers and the City of Chicago, a failure to intervene claim
against the same defendants and a number of responding officers, as
well as various state law claims.120 All the defendants moved for
summary judgment on all counts.121
As in Scott v. Harris, the videos appear to have assumed an outsized
role in the assessment of the evidence. After viewing the videos taken
from at least three different security cameras, the judge narrated what he
was able to see, including a good deal of violence against plaintiffs both
inside and outside the bar.122 He concluded that not only should the
summary judgment motions be denied but that they were “overreaching
attempts to redefine the legal standards for summary judgment” in the
face of “copious video evidence [that] shows the Defendant Officers
fighting with Plaintiffs.”123 In support of their motion, defendants
pointed to numerous inconsistent or implausible statements made by
plaintiffs and some evidence that Barry Gilfand did not suffer any
injury.124 In the face of conflicting evidence that suggests a genuine issue
of material fact, it is undoubtedly right to deny summary judgment. My
concern is not with the finding that summary judgment was improper
but that it was improper because the video was self-evident and its very
clarity allowed it to trump conflicting evidence. According to the judge,
the relevant “portions of the video . . . speak for themselves.”125
Noteworthy in Gilfand is the relationship between video and other
evidence. The defendants sought to argue that their supporting evidence
so clearly refuted plaintiffs’ evidence that the motion should be
granted.126 More than once, however, the court insisted that other pieces
of the record cannot “erase [the] video evidence,”127 and it even implied

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/1

Id.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *3–5.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2007)).
Id. at *6.
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that video evidence may be able to refute other sources of evidence, but
it is unlikely to work in reverse:
Defendants argue that the evidence outside of the video
contradicts Plaintiffs’ story to such an extent that a
ruling of summary judgment in their favor is warranted.
Contrary to their argument, Scott v. Harris does not
support their Motions. In Scott, the Supreme Court used
a video that showed the respondent driving so fast and
recklessly that the video clearly refuted the respondent’s
argument that he did not drive in a manner that
endangered human life. . . . The record does not so
blatantly contradict Plaintiffs’ story so as to preclude
such a jury verdict.128
In a sense, this confusion over the summary judgment standard—a
confusion that the court in Gilfand attributes to defendants129—is the
logical extension of the confusion sowed by Scott v. Harris where unclear
facts and conflicting interpretations are represented not as genuine
issues of fact but as irrefutable visual evidence.
Unlike Scott, greater visual literacy in Gilfand would have been
unlikely to change the outcome, but it could have certainly helped to
minimize rather than perpetuate the ongoing confusion about the role of
video evidence at summary judgment. A small portion of the video
evidence that the Gilfand court considered is available on the Internet.130
It shows many of the acts of force that the court described in its order;
yet, applying the techniques of visual interpretation, I have suggested,
illuminate other things that ought to be taken into account. For one, the
security cameras here are elevated above the scene, so that the viewer is
not watching the action from the perspective of any participant but in a
position of a detached observer. As is common with security cameras,
the image quality is not good and there is no audio. The elevated angle
also tends to obscure some of the action that takes place on the floor.
The various camera shots capture many parts of the bar and the sidewalk
out front, but they do not necessarily capture important aspects of the

Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
Id. (“Defendants ask the Court to create a novel standard for summary
judgment . . . .”); supra text accompanying note 124.
130
ChicagoCopwatch, Men Beaten by Chicago Cops Were ‘Defenseless,’ YOUTUBE (Mar. 23,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9ZIGsLJqdo.
128
129
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action, and in some key moments the fighting occurs outside the frame
entirely.131
In addition, the court says nothing about how the images were
selected and by whom, so we do not know whose judgment determined
which images were considered relevant. The portions of the video
online are embedded in a news program, so a television producer made
the selection available to the public and for purposes quite distinct from
those animating civil discovery.132 Relatedly, the context in which the
public can view the videos, with the reporter’s voiceover about the case,
presents a dramatically different viewing context than the environment
in which the judge viewed the videos or in which the jury watched them
once the case went to trial.133
As always, the experiences, attitudes, and perspectives of each
viewer also inform the way any image is perceived. I offer these
additional readings of slices of the video images to model a very basic
visual literacy, to show the ways in which the videos in this case could
not speak for themselves, and to illuminate how the judicial assumption
that they could speak for themselves perpetuated the confusion about
the legal standard for summary judgment inherited from Scott v. Harris.
C. McDowell v. Sherrer
Lastly, I want to highlight another recent case, in which there were
two videos and two competing court interpretations, to show how even
when the visual evidence itself is contradictory, judges lacking a critical
visual literacy can still insist that the images speak for themselves.
However, in this case there is interpretive tension between the two
different videos and between the trial and appellate courts, and in this
interpretive tension is the promise of different ways of seeing and
reading legal images.
In McDowell v. Sherrer,134 two inmates at the Northern State Prison in
New Jersey—Steven McDowell and Carlos Cruz—were released from
their cell in the early morning hours of November 8, 2004, after
complaints that Cruz was ill and vomiting.135 After their release, events
131
Gilfand, 2011 WL 4036110, at *2–3 (noting that the fight in the vestibule as well as other
incidents were not captured by the security cameras at all).
132
See ChicagoCopwatch, supra note 130.
133
See Verdict in Jefferson Tap Civil Case Faults 4 Officers for Brawl, CBS CHI. (May 18, 2012,
7:27 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/05/18/verdict-in-jefferson-tap-civil-casefaults-4-officers-for-brawl/ (reporting that plaintiffs recovered more than $33,000 from the
officers in the federal civil trial).
134
No. 04-6089 (KSH), 2008 WL 4542475, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2008), rev’d in part, 374 F.
App’x 288 (3d Cir. 2010).
135
Id. at *3.
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become unclear. The State claimed that both inmates were immediately
violent and had feigned illness to be released.136 McDowell and Cruz
claimed that they were seeking medical attention but conceded that they
did not submit to handcuffing and did not return to their cell.137 In
response, prison guards formed heavily armed “extraction teams” to
corral the two inmates, remove them from the “tier,” and forcibly put
them back in their cell.138 The question before the court was whether
McDowell’s excessive force claim could be dismissed on summary
judgment.139 Much like the flight in Scott v. Harris, cell extraction invites
a police response, but even where plaintiff’s conduct begins the
exchange with correctional officers, the officers are under a
constitutional obligation to avoid excessive force.140
In McDowell, the interaction between the inmates and the extraction
teams was caught on film by two different cameras, one in the hands of
another inmate, Omar Broadway,141 and the other used by prison
officials to film the cell extraction.142 The district court order on the
State’s motion for summary judgment represents a clear articulation of
the power of video evidence: “If a picture is worth a thousand words,
two live-action videos are good for at least a million.”143 Relying on Scott
v. Harris, the district court assumed that the presence of video evidence
augmented the summary judgment standard and quoted a long passage
from Scott to show “how the preexisting summary judgment framework
Even with multiple and
must accommodate video evidence.”144
contradictory videos, the judge believed the visual evidence allowed her
to witness the event in person. The district court noted that “the
136
McDowell v. Sheerer [sic], 374 Fed. App’x 288, 290–91 (3d Cir. 2010), rev’g in part, No.
04-6089 (KSH), 2008 WL 4542475 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2008).
137
Id.
138
McDowell, 2008 WL 4542475, at *3–4.
139
Id. at *1.
140
See id. at *11 (“Where a prisoner alleges that officers used excessive force upon him,
‘the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and
suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith efort [sic] to maintain
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” (quoting
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)). In this case, the district court conceded that the
officers used significant force but found it significant that “McDowell and Cruz, as
revealed by the videos, had visibly taunted corrections officers, flouted prison rules and
disobeyed commands, shielded themselves from pepper spray, and had further invited a
violent confrontation.” Id. at *12.
141
Id. at *5. Broadway’s recordings, including excerpts of the video at issue in McDowell,
became a documentary film about prison violence entitled, An Omar Broadway Film. Id. at
*5 n.3; AN OMAR BROADWAY FILM (4th Row Films 2008).
142
McDowell, 2008 WL 4542475, at *4.
143
Id. at *1.
144
Id. at *1–2.
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[ordinary summary judgment] standards are challenging enough. Here,
however, the Court has before it two videos . . . and therefore must apply
the governing summary judgment standards having witnessed with its
own eyes the events at the core of this litigation.”145 Once a judge believes
herself to be a witness, it becomes extremely difficult to apply a
summary judgment standard that asks the trial court not to weigh the
evidence, view it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
and dispassionately assess whether a reasonable jury could find for that
party.
Indeed, the district court’s reading of the videos evinces the
difficulty of being both witness and judge. Repeatedly throughout the
order, the court found that the videos ‘“blatantly contradict[],”’ “flatly
contradict[],” and “manifestly disprove[]” evidence supporting
plaintiff’s version of events while “revealing” what actually happened.146
Rather than viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
McDowell, the court used the videos to discount plaintiff’s allegations of
what occurred by referring to them as a “story spun” and a “tale.”147 The
court concluded that “the videos contradict the entire tenor of
McDowell’s account.”148
The Third Circuit’s opinion,149 in contrast, disagreed with the district
court not only over what the videos said but how they should be read in
light of the summary judgment standard. In reversing the district court,
the Third Circuit concluded that because “neither of the videos ‘blatantly
contradict[s]’ McDowell’s account such that no reasonable jury could
believe it,” summary judgment was improper.150 One key difference
between the courts’ analyses with respect to summary judgment is that
the court of appeals made a point of noting the portions of the videos
that appeared to support McDowell’s account:
In both videos, McDowell can be heard yelling “I am not
resisting” when he is underneath the officers. Second,
the video recorded by the inmate shows that an officer
who was standing near McDowell’s body did have a
nightstick in his hand—consistent with McDowell’s
testimony that he was hit in the head repeatedly by
nightsticks. Additionally, when McDowell is led away
Id. at *1.
Id. at *12–13, *16.
147
Id. at *12–13.
148
Id. at *15.
149
McDowell v. Sheerer [sic], 374 F. App’x 288, 292–93 (3d Cir. 2010), rev’g in part, No. 046089 (KSH), 2008 WL 4542475 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2008).
150
Id.
145
146
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from the tier, his face is covered with blood, suggesting
that he suffered an injury during the extraction. As
McDowell is led off the tier floor, an officer has his arm
around McDowell’s neck and McDowell is pressed
against the wall. The officers thereafter lay McDowell to
the ground, as if he is not able to stand on his own.
These events are consistent with McDowell’s testimony
that he was choked until he was unconscious.151
The fundamental difference between the courts is in their approach
to visual interpretation. The Third Circuit’s analysis was noteworthy not
for its sophistication in reading the images but for its interpretive
restraint and lack of credulity. The court of appeals admitted that while
the videos showed McDowell and Cruz yelling at the officers, it was
“unable to determine from the videos whether McDowell [was] resisting
the officers or to determine the amount of force used on him. . . . because
McDowell [was] forced to the ground early in the confrontation, and the
view of his body is completely obstructed.”152 The court employed the
kernels of a visual literacy when it recognized what the camera does and
does not show. The camera, the Third Circuit noted, “simply do[es] not
show what happened during these crucial moments.”153 In this way, the
court of appeals’ order is based on different premises with respect to
both the legal standard and visual interpretation, rejecting the district
court’s over-reliance on both the image and the Supreme Court decision
in Scott.154 The Third Circuit recognized that the camera is often severely
limited with respect to the exact questions courts must answer and that
even witnessing something “with our own eyes” can be complicated if
we cannot really see what is happening.
The appellate court’s analysis would have been stronger had it
employed the techniques of visual interpretation for which I have
argued. The only publicly available excerpts of the video evidence in
McDowell are on YouTube and incorporated into a trailer for An Omar
Broadway Film,155 a film that was screened at the 2008 Tribeca Film

Id. at 293.
Id. at 292–93.
153
Id. at 293.
154
Id. at 292 (relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott for the proposition that the
videos at issue “blatantly contradict[ed]” McDowell’s version of the events).
155
4thRow Films, An Omar Broadway Film Trailer, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OK-tbfE-yts&list=PL49E86EB7D4D4E86B.
151
152
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Festival and aired on HBO.156 Because these excerpts are very short and
don’t include any portions of the video shot by the prison officials, my
analysis is brief and admittedly speculative. The influence of the
medium is striking in Omar Broadway’s video: the video camera was
kept hidden and the shots are very constrained, penned in by the
physical space of the cell, or taken from between the bars and often at a
disorienting angle. Like the dash-cam video in Scott v. Harris, both
videos in McDowell v. Sherrer have a point of view, each placing the
viewer in the position of either the guards or an inmate. The fact that
both were available in the case is noteworthy; Broadway’s video formed
a visual rebuttal to the video shot by the extraction team and may have
had something to do with the Third Circuit’s reversal. While viewing
the videos in a courtroom or chambers and in the context of a summary
judgment motion is common to all these cases, the other contexts in
which portions of the videos can be seen is illuminating. In An Omar
Broadway Film the videos are embedded in a dramatized documentary
about the violence, danger, and boredom of prison life. The trailers, like
the film, are narrated, edited, and put to music in ways that emphasize
the gritty realities of prison and the vulnerabilities of the inmates.
Consider how different the same images may look when viewed on
HBO or YouTube as entertainment or assessed by federal courts as
evidence. Attention to this difference in viewing environment may help
judges realize that to read videos as legal evidence is to read them
through an established interpretive lens that changes the ways images
are seen. Lastly, the viewers—law clerk, judge, student, inmate,
television executive, etc.—all come with their own ways of seeing that is
informed by experience, identity, and social conditions. The different
perceptions of the audience allows for multiple minority reports.
Lawyers will do better by their clients at summary judgment if they have
more interpretive techniques at their disposal, and courts will do better
by the litigants if they have the visual literacy to allow videos the same
range of meaning they allow to text and testimony.
V. CONCLUSION AND A RETURN TO MINORITY REPORT
In conclusion, I return to Minority Report to contrast the film’s
approach to law’s reliance on video evidence with the law’s own
approach. Film has a long history of critiquing its own forms of
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representation,157 but it is more unusual for it to critique law’s use of
film. In many ways, Minority Report can be read as a critique of the
seductive role of visual evidence within the law and the tendency to
believe the accuracy and totality of what we see in the face of the
excessiveness of the image. Minority Report is most often discussed in
legal literature as a vision of a dystopic surveillance state. It is certainly
that, but it is also a meditation on the power and abuse of sight and
visuality. In this sense, it is a parable about the dangers of readily
believing what we see and of lacking a critical visual literacy.
The world of 2054 is portrayed as one in which the saturation of
images we experience today has only been enhanced and compounded
by new technologies. Everyone is eye-scanned as they enter buildings,
stores, and subway stations; as they walk through public spaces, video
billboards address them personally and magazines sport moving
images.158 Video is not only projected in 3-D, but the red-light pleasurepalaces use images to create simulated fantasies individually tailored to
each person.159 Moreover, there are verbal refrains throughout the movie
about sight, blindness, and knowledge. Agatha, the most gifted of the
precogs, repeatedly says, “Can’t you see?”—a phrase which captures our
common-sense conflation of sight and understanding.160 Both the plot
and the images of the movie are about the tricks of sight, the power of
images, and the law’s fatally blind over-reliance on them. The shots,
editing, and lighting of the movie are often disorienting, drawing the
viewers’ attention to the unreality and unreliability of what they are
seeing on the screen. The movie also layers images on top of each other
so that we see characters seeing images, as in the still of Anderton
examining the visions of the precogs.161 However, the transparency of
the screen within the film allows a double viewing and draws the viewer
into the world and surveillance plot of the film: the viewer sees
Anderton viewing the images on screen but also has the sensation of
being viewed through the screen as well. In this way the film projects
the problems of seeing and believing out into the world of the audience.
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The Transparent Screen: Minority Report (Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. 2002)
The many shots of Anderton viewing the visions of the precogs are
shots of law enforcement reading visual evidence. The film draws our
attention to the “technologies” through which the images within the
movie and the images of the movie are manipulated, arranged, given
significance, and made to speak. The visual evidence within the film is
quite literally manipulated and arranged by Anderton with high-tech
equipment that allows him to sort through the images of the precogs for
the legally relevant details. Likewise, the film images themselves are
arranged and given meaning through cinematic technologies. The
audience experiences different ways of seeing and not seeing through
the use of perspective, framing, lighting, movement, sound, pacing, and
plot. The dramatic chase scene in the mall toward the end of the movie
encapsulates this cinematic lesson; the slightest adjustments of angle,
timing, and chance dramatically change what we are able to see.
The critique launched by the movie against the law’s use of images is
one the law ought to take seriously: that desire for clarity and truth
encourages a willful denial of the fallibility of sight and the inevitable
variety in ways of seeing and narrating the image. It suggests that in our
dedication to apparent truth and our naïve reliance on the image, we
countenance injustice. In Minority Report, the existence of a minority
report meant that alternative futures were available for some of the
people imprisoned for murders they had not yet committed. Given the
excess information that images bring to the courtroom and the paltry
interpretive tools that lawyers and judges bring to images, we need to
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imagine alternative futures to the one that the Supreme Court
condemned us to in Scott v. Harris—a future in which we abandon our
critical thinking and visual judgment and let the image speak for itself.
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